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A B S T R A C T   
The COVID-19 pandemic might have tremendous consequences on decarbonization efforts across the globe. 
Understanding governments’ policy action in the short and medium term is key to assess whether the response to 
the crisis will crowd out or fast-track decarbonization efforts. We surveyed over 200 policymakers and stake-
holders from 55 different countries to collect climate policy expectations in various sectors and regions in the 
next five years. While support for high-emitting sectors is not expected to dissolve completely, commitment to 
policies supporting the transition to low-carbon energy and transport sectors is expected to increase substan-
tially. This is true for OECD and Asian countries, representing approximately 90% of global emissions. Our results 
suggest that expectations that the COVID-19 pandemic will accelerate decarbonization efforts are widely shared.   
1. Introduction 
The COVID-19 crisis has produced a shock to economic activity, 
social interactions, work organization, and citizens’ everyday lives in 
most countries in the world. China, the European Union, the United 
States, and other top emitters have been significantly affected by the 
crisis. The pandemic and the public health measures implemented to 
address it have produced an unprecedented fall in greenhouse gas 
emissions. More than half of the world population have been subject to 
lockdowns, which has impacted short-term mobility behavior, energy 
demand, and industrial production [1,2]. Based on Google and Apple 
mobility data, Forster et al. [3] estimate that during April 2020, more 
than half of the world’s population reduced travel by more than 50 
percent. 
Le Quéré et al. [2] have estimated that in April 2020 daily global CO2 
emissions decreased by 17 percent compared to mean levels in 2019. Liu 
et al. [4] argue that CO2 emissions drops during the first half of 2019 
were higher than during the economic crisis or World War II. However, 
the crisis’s and the lockdowns’ effects on emissions reductions will be 
short-term and negligible in the absence of additional policies acceler-
ating decarbonization [3]. In response to the crisis, governments are 
putting in place recovery packages that are often unprecedented in size 
since the post-war period. Estimates range from $9tn to $15tn of pledged 
commitments, with the US and the European Union having by far the 
largest shares [5,6]. The opportunity for new investments could put the 
world on track to achieve the Paris Agreement goals [5], but the specific 
design of recovery packages will critically determine whether the crisis 
will be an accelerator of climate action or will further reinforce current 
socio-technical regimes and the carbon lock-in these regimes entail [7]. 
Albeit the 2008 economic crisis opened a short window of oppor-
tunity for a sustainability transition, the opportunity was not seized [8]. 
Today, there is a danger of politicians focusing on economic recovery at 
the expense of decarbonization action and countries simply not having 
enough financial capacity to support more expensive climate policies. 
However, changed social attitudes and governments’ more proactive 
fiscal approach might produce a different outcome. Additionally, 
increased teleworking and changed mobility routines might make 
demand-driven emission reductions considerably easier [9,10]. 
Currently, the world is at a critical juncture to facilitate the low- 
carbon transition because several technological, economic, political, 
and social enabling conditions are present. A study by BloombergNEF 
estimates that solar PV and onshore wind are among the cheapest 
sources of new-build generation for two-thirds of the global population 
[11]. The number of climate laws and regulations is also increasing, 
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signaling greater political will to address climate change [12]. The 
strength of the global climate movement was unprecedented before the 
COVID-19 crisis struck, with Greta Thunberg and Fridays for Future 
leading a record social mobilization around the climate crisis. Before the 
pandemic, public attention on climate change soared in 2019, with 
media coverage of climate change and climate internet search activity 
reaching unmatched levels [13,14]. Changed public attitudes might now 
allow implementing more stringent decarbonization policies. 
Hepburn et al. [15] have recently surveyed senior economists to 
identify the most promising policies in terms of both economic multi-
plier and positive climate potential. However, the overall climate impact 
of public policies implemented in response to the pandemic is to date 
unclear, as the COVID-19 crisis is still ongoing [6]. The decisions that 
will be taken by governments in the next few years, both on the design of 
recovery packages and on climate policy ambition, can determine 
whether the COVID-19 crisis will crowd out decarbonization efforts or 
create synergies, leading to a green recovery [3,5,15]. 
While there are significant efforts to collect and evaluate recovery 
packages, many governments are still defining their policies to address 
the economic consequences of the pandemic. Understanding emerging 
patterns and cross-national differences can provide essential insights to 
understand the medium-term effects of the COVID-19 crisis on global 
efforts to address climate change. The implications of the pandemic for 
the energy transition have already attracted considerable academic 
attention, producing focused special issues [6,17], and many prominent 
articles. Scholars call for data collection and evaluation efforts, as the 
COVID-19 crisis presents a unique opportunity to explore a “major 
landscape shock” to technological and societal systems [9]. 
Our Perspective answers these calls by presenting results from a 
survey of over 200 policymakers and stakeholders developed to collect 
insights on emerging trends in a wide range of countries and sectors. We 
focus mainly on policies pertaining to the decarbonization of the energy 
and transport sectors, which are responsible for over 70% of current 
carbon emissions. Surveys of decision-makers and experts are a powerful 
and reliable tool to assess policy positions [18-20], and are widely used 
in some political science sub-fields. Our contribution is an example of a 
data collection technique that might be of great use for energy transition 
research [21]. By presenting the results of this survey collecting highly 
informed policy expectations, we hope to contribute to shedding light on 
whether crucial policy decisions taken in the post-pandemic period are 
more likely to accelerate or postpone the energy transition. 
2. Research design and data 
The objective of this study is to provide insights on the expected 
impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on national decarbonization efforts by 
eliciting the expectations of highly informed policymakers and stake-
holders. Policymaker and stakeholder surveys are a well-established tool 
to assess policy positions, preferences, and beliefs and are widely 
employed in several research domains to study policy networks, political 
parties [19,22,18], and future technology developments [23]. Their 
confidential nature makes survey responses less susceptible to public 
pressure or strategic behavior that could drive public statements 
[20,22]. By providing information on key societal stakeholders’ posi-
tions and beliefs or informed expectations on government policy, expert 
and stakeholder surveys can significantly contribute to ongoing 
research. For example, they may help focus quantitative and analytical 
studies on the energy transition and help analysts fruitfully direct their 
efforts. 
Our survey aimed at collecting respondents’ expectations on national 
policy directions focusing on the energy and transport sector, which 
were expected to be most affected by the pandemic [15,3,24]. We 
formulated all questions asking about expected trends in the next five 
years. We included a set of questions to collect data on respondents’ 
backgrounds, general expectations about the crisis’s duration, and the 
overall assessment of the country’s climate ambition before the COVID- 
19 crisis. Details on the survey protocol and the complete survey ques-
tionnaire are provided in the Appendix. 
We administered the survey to policymakers and stakeholders with 
country-specific expertise. We collected responses through a snowball 
sampling methodology from different seeds, intending to cover the most 
comprehensive set of countries, focusing on the highest emitters. We 
also administered the survey to invited participants to the IEA/OECD 
Climate Change Expert Group (CCXG) Global Forum on the Environ-
ment and Climate Change. Participants include government officials and 
delegates from inter-governmental organizations and other relevant 
institutions involved in international climate negotiations. 
We reached policymakers and stakeholders working for national 
governments, international organizations, research institutions, non- 
governmental and private sector organizations. The data collection 
started on May 28, 2020 and lasted until October 12, 2020. We collected 
223 complete responses from 55 different countries. Almost half of our 
respondents (104) declared that they are at least in part directly 
involved in the formulation of future climate, energy, or environmental 
Fig. 1. International Climate Cooperation and Public Spending for Climate Mitigation - Likert scale plot of the answers to the questions on expected trends for 
International Climate Cooperation and Public Spending for Climate Mitigation in the next five years for OECD, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
Answers based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from significantly decrease to significantly increase. 
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policies. Details on respondents’ country of expertise and background 
are reported in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. The United States is 
underrepresented in our data; the US elections’ unknown outcome at the 
time of data collection made climate policy forecasts highly uncertain, 
resulting in fewer policymakers willing to take the survey. 
3. Results 
We present our results for three macro-regions: (1) OECD countries; 
(2) Asian countries - excluding the Middle East, Japan, Korea, and 
Former Soviet Union countries (ASIA); and (3) Latin America and 
Caribbean countries (LAM). We collected 104 responses on OECD 
countries, 52 on Asian countries, and 49 on Latin American and Carib-
bean countries. Shedding light on emerging trends in these regions, 
which together are responsible for approximately 90% of global emis-
sions, provides a picture of the possible direction of global decarbon-
ization efforts in the medium term. As we collected a minimal number of 
responses on Middle Eastern, African, Balkan, and former Soviet coun-
tries, we only present key results for these regions in the Appendix 
(Fig. A1). 
3.1. General expectations 
We first present results for items that allow us to have a general 
overview of expectations in different regions, focusing on expected 
public spending for climate mitigation, international climate coopera-
tion efforts, and emission trends. We also present expectations on future 
support for climate mitigation among the general population and among 
businesses. We then focus on policies promoting the low-carbon tran-
sition in the energy and transport sector. We finally present expectations 
on support to high-emitting companies and sectors. 
When evaluating countries’ commitment to climate action, public 
spending for climate mitigation and international climate cooperation 
efforts are two key aspects to consider. Fig. 1 shows that respondents in 
all three regions are divided on international climate cooperation ex-
pectations in the next five years. For OECD and Asian countries, re-
spondents lean towards a moderate or significant increase in 
cooperation, while a slight to significant decrease is expected in Latin 
America. Similarly, public spending for climate mitigation is expected to 
increase in OECD and Asian countries. Overall, respondents from these 
regions expect that the pandemic and its economic effects will not 
impede governments’ commitment to climate action. The majority even 
see an opportunity for a green recovery. Conversely, in Latin American 
countries, different expectations on the crisis’s economic impacts and 
governments’ responses translate into looming expectations on public 
spending for climate mitigation (with 65% of responses expecting a 
moderate or significant decrease). 
Interestingly, when looking at expected climate mitigation support 
among businesses and the general public, an increase is expected in all 
the regions under consideration (see Fig. 2). This mirrors a recent IPSOS 
study that finds that concern over climate change is still high globally. 
Seventy-one percent of this global survey’s respondents consider climate 
change as severe a crisis as COVID-19, and a similar proportion is feeling 
that their government will be failing them if it doesn’t act on climate 
change now [25]. 
To have a more general look at expected decarbonization trends in 
the next five years, we can focus on emission trends (see Fig. 3). The 
majority of respondents expect emissions to decrease in the next five 
years compared to past trends, with 76% and 52% of responses on OECD 
and Asian countries respectively expecting a further decline in 
Fig. 2. Expected Public and Business Support for Mitigation. Likert scale plot of the answers to the questions on expected trends for Business Support for Climate 
Mitigation and Public Support for Climate Mitigation in the next five years for OECD, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean countries. Answers based on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from significantly decrease to significantly increase. 
Fig. 3. Emission Trends. Likert scale plot of the answers to the question on expected Emission Trends in the next five years for OECD, Asian, and Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Answers based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from significantly decrease to significantly increase. 
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Fig. 5. Policies Promoting the Low-carbon Transition in the Energy Sector. Likert scale plot of the answers to the questions on expected trends for governments’ 
commitment to Investments in Clean Energy Infrastructure, Investments in Clean Research & Development, Coal Phase-out Plans, Energy Efficiency Investments and 
Subsidies to Renewables in the next five years for OECD, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean countries. Answers based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
significantly decrease to significantly increase. 
Fig. 4. Carbon Pricing. Likert scale plot of the answers to the questions on expected trends for the commitment to Cap-and-trade Systems and Carbon Taxes in the 
next five years for OECD, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean countries. Answers based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from significantly decrease to 
significantly increase. 
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emissions. In Latin American countries, emissions are instead expected 
to increase, possibly driven by the low commitment to climate mitiga-
tion in Brazil, the primary emitter in the region. However, this should 
not significantly affect global decarbonization efforts, as Latin American 
and Caribbean countries are responsible for a relatively small share of 
global CO2 emissions [26]. 
3.2. Expectations on policies promoting the low-carbon transition 
To better understand the future trends in CO2 emissions, it is 
essential to compare expectations concerning “green” policies support-
ing decarbonization efforts versus policies supporting or bailing out 
“brown” companies. Evaluations of stimulus packages available when 
this paper was written depict a relatively gloomy picture, suggesting 
that these packages have failed, so far, to harness the opportunity to-
wards more climate-friendly policies [16]. Our analysis, however, sug-
gests relatively optimistic expectations for the next five years. 
3.3. Carbon pricing systems 
Expectations on carbon pricing systems, including cap-and-trade 
mechanisms and carbon taxes, are unclear, with slightly less opti-
mistic expectations for Latin American countries than for OECD and 
Asian countries (see Fig. 4). 
3.4. Energy sector 
During the first wave of the pandemic, the energy sector has expe-
rienced a fall in energy demand, producing a steep decline in energy- 
related emissions [2,3]. However, the longer-term impact of the crisis 
is uncertain and will depend on energy investments and government 
decisions to support low-carbon energy production. The current relative 
economic performance of fossil and renewable energy suggests that 
further carbon lock-in might be less likely than in the past [24]. In our 
survey, we assessed expected commitment to a series of policies pro-
moting the transition to a low-carbon energy sector, including in-
vestments in clean energy infrastructure, investment in clean Research 
& Development, coal phase-out plans, energy efficiency investments, 
and subsidies to renewables. We find that expectations are overall rather 
positive (see Fig. 5). Moving to the examination of cross-regional dif-
ferences, OECD countries are expected to be more ambitious, followed 
by Asian and Latin American countries. Even for Latin American 
Fig. 6. Policies Promoting the Low-carbon Transition in the Transport Sector. Likert scale plot of the answers to the questions on expected trends for the 
Investments in Clean Long-distance and Urban Transport in the next five years for OECD, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean countries. Answers based on a 7- 
point Likert scale ranging from significantly decrease to significantly increase. 
Fig. 7. Policies Hampering the Low-carbon Transition. Likert scale plot of the answers to the questions on expectations on Airline Bailouts and Financial Support 
for High-carbon Energy and Industry Sectors in the next five years for OECD, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean countries. Answers are based on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from significantly unlikely to significantly likely. 
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countries, approximately half of respondents expect an increased 
commitment to green energy policies (except for coal phase-out plans, 
on which expectations are unclear). For OECD countries, 83% of re-
sponses expect an increased commitment to investments in clean energy 
infrastructure. Similarly, expectations concerning energy efficiency in-
vestments and clean Research & Development are very optimistic (with 
75% and 72% of respondents expecting an increase in the commitment 
of national governments). Expectations on subsidies to renewables are 
Fig. 8. Expectations on Public Spending for Climate Mitigation among respondents working for different organizations - Likert scale plot of the answers to 
the question on expected trends for Public Spending for Climate Mitigation in the next five years for OECD, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean countries, and 
for respondents working for governments, research or academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations. Answers based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from significantly decrease to significantly increase. 
Fig. 9. Expectations on Emission Trends among respondents working for different organizations - Likert scale plot of the answers to the question on expected 
Emission Trends in the next five years for OECD, Asian, and Latin American and Caribbean countries, and for respondents working for governments, research or 
academic institutions, and non-governmental organizations. Answers based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from significantly decrease to significantly increase. 
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slightly less optimistic, but more than half of responses predict an 
increased commitment in the next five years for all regions. When we 
turn to policies to phase out coal, respondents in OECD and Asian 
countries expect governments to push this process forward, while gov-
ernments in Latin American countries are expected to be timider. Given 
the economic, political, and social costs associated with phase-out pol-
icies, it is not surprising that expectations are much less optimistic than 
those concerning policies promoting the growth of renewable energy 
production and use. 
3.5. Transport sector 
The transport sector’s transformation will crucially depend on gov-
ernments’ infrastructure investment decisions, through the investment 
in rail networks and infrastructure, the construction of bike lanes, and 
the development of electric vehicle charging station networks. Our 
survey data suggest that investments in clean transport infrastructure, 
especially at the urban level, are expected to experience a substantial 
increase. As evident in Fig. 6, increased investments in clean urban 
transport infrastructure are considered likely in all three regions under 
consideration. Interestingly, expectations are slightly more optimistic in 
Asian countries than in OECD countries. Investments in long-distance 
transport infrastructure are expected to increase in OECD and Asian 
countries, while Latin American countries’ expectations are less clear. 
However, expectations of long-distance transport infrastructure are 
slightly less favorable compared to those for clean urban transport. 
While not providing a complete picture of overall decarbonization 
trends in the transport sector, these results suggest that this sector might 
experience a transition faster than expected in the post-pandemic 
period. 
3.6. Expectations on policies hampering the low-carbon transition 
The amount of financial support provided by governments to high- 
carbon energy and industrial sectors as a response to the COVID-19 
crisis is another key aspect to consider to determine whether an accel-
eration of decarbonization efforts is possible in the next five years. 
Bailing out fossil sectors hit by the crisis might significantly postpone the 
low-carbon transition. 
Our survey data suggests that financial support to high-carbon en-
ergy and industrial sectors in the next five years is considered moder-
ately likely in OECD, Asian, and Latin American countries. Fig. 7 shows 
that airline bailouts, which are highly likely to slow down decarbon-
ization, are considered extremely likely in OECD countries and are very 
likely in Asian countries. This result is in line with what has been found 
by the Airline Bailout Tracker developed by Transport & Environment, 
Carbon Market Watch, and Greenpeace. Their analysis estimates that 
since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis the major European airlines 
have received roughly 29 billion euro without any binding environ-
mental conditions [27]. Overall, respondents are unsure whether the 
post-crisis period will end government support to high-emitting sectors 
over the coming years. 
3.7. Comparing expectations of respondents working for different 
organizations 
Respondents working in different organizations can have different 
expectations due to different backgrounds and expertise. We compare 
expectations on emission trends and public spending for climate miti-
gation of respondents working for (1) governments, (2) research or ac-
ademic institutions, and (3) non-governmental organizations (see Figs. 8 
and 9). Interestingly, respondents working for governments have more 
optimistic expectations on future trends of public spending for climate 
mitigation than respondents working for other organizations. In Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, the expectations of respondents 
working for research institutions and non-governmental organizations 
are very pessimistic. In OECD and Asian countries, these categories of 
respondents are only slightly more pessimistic than those working for 
governments. 
Expectations of future emission trends in OECD countries are more 
optimistic among respondents working for governments and research 
institutions. Respondents working for non-governmental organizations 
are overall less sure that emissions will significantly decrease in the next 
five years. In Asian and Latin American countries, respondents working 
for governments and non-governmental organizations have moderate 
expectations on emission reductions, while researchers and academics 
are more pessimistic. 
4. Conclusion 
The 2018 IPCC Special Report has highlighted how rapid decar-
bonization action is required to reach the Paris Agreement’s long-term 
goal and limit global average temperature increase to well below two 
degrees above pre-industrial levels [28]. Postponing the decarbon-
ization of the economy today leads to more abrupt changes being 
required in the future. The next few years might provide the last op-
portunity to put in place decarbonization strategies that allow reaching 
the Paris Agreement goal and avoid the most adverse impacts and 
irreversible damages of climate change [29]. The exogenous shock 
produced by the COVID-19 pandemic and the proactive economic policy 
approach taken by many governments to address the crisis has opened a 
window of opportunity for fast-tracking decarbonization through 
increased government spending and green sectors’ investments, to 
decouple economic recovery and greenhouse gas emissions. 
We present the results of a survey of policymakers and stakeholders 
developed to collect informed expectations on the likely direction of 
government policies in the next five years in OECD, Asian, and Latin 
American countries. Overall, survey respondents expect that the COVID- 
19 crisis will not necessarily crowd out decarbonization efforts, slowing 
down the global energy transition. Still, some critical factors may water 
down the recovery phase’s transformative potential. On the one hand, 
commitment to policies supporting decarbonization may increase in 
OECD and Asian countries, which are today responsible for most global 
emissions. This represents an opportunity to reduce emissions across 
various sectors. The power sector will be at the core of this trans-
formation, given the expected surge in green infrastructure and 
renewable power production investments. Notably, there are positive 
expectations on several policies with high potential on economic 
multiplier and climate impact, including energy efficiency investments, 
clean Research & Development, and investments in clean energy infra-
structure [15]. On the other hand, some results are less promising. Latin 
American respondents tend to be overall more pessimistic. Support for 
incumbent, high-emitting sectors is also likely to continue in most re-
gions, with airline companies’ bailouts deemed extremely likely. Inter-
estingly, respondents working for governments have more optimistic 
expectations compared to respondents from non-governmental organi-
zations and research institutions. 
In general, expectations are more optimistic in countries with higher 
per capita income and higher past climate performance. Significant 
decarbonization action taking place only in a subset of highly emitting 
advanced and developing economies might be sufficient to accelerate 
global decarbonization and kick-start the required technological change. 
The European Union’s commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050 and 
the renewed climate commitment of the new US administration, 
together with the recent announcement of China’s pledge to achieve 
carbon neutrality by 2060, shed new light on the future policy direction 
of three of the world’s largest emitters. 
An explicit limitation of our study is related to its geographical 
coverage. We could not reach a sizable number of respondents from 
Middle East, African, and Former Soviet Union countries, and a broader 
set of responses on the United States and China would have strengthened 
our results. Moreover, given our focus on national policies, our results 
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do not cover local and regional policies, which might also considerably 
contribute to global decarbonization efforts. As the situation is contin-
ually evolving, and national policy decisions will ultimately depend on 
country-specific social, economic, and political economy factors, our 
results have to be interpreted as a collection of highly informed expec-
tations. These results can provide useful insights to researchers in 
particular when data on policy decisions are not available yet. 
The main contribution of this Perspective is a snapshot of policy-
makers’ and stakeholders’ expectations regarding the trajectory of 
climate policies in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. In the future, with 
the increased availability of data on COVID-19-related policies, the re-
sults of this survey can be compared with more systematic assessments 
of the implemented policies. Our results suggest that there are key dif-
ferences across regions and countries. Future research should also 
explore the determinants of countries’ decisions on whether to reinforce 
the status quo by supporting incumbent sectors or take the current crisis 
as an opportunity to fast-track decarbonization action. 
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Appendix 
Survey development procedure 
Our target population included policymakers and stakeholders, 
ideally directly involved in policymaking affecting future trajectories of 
climate policies. This requirement made limiting the survey length 
crucial to collect a good number of complete responses. The data 
collection phase of surveys of these populations requires a major effort 
and having a long survey significantly reduces the response rate [30]. 
This constrains the number of questions we could include in our survey. 
To ensure that the selection of questions was systematic and relied on 
available evidence, we first carefully analyzed emerging insights on the 
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on decarbonization efforts and tried 
to identify the sectors that were expected to be most affected [15,3,24]. 
As drastic changes in energy demand were being observed, we decided 
to focus our survey on the decarbonization of the electricity and trans-
port sectors. 
We first produced an extended version of the survey with a broader 
set of questions, including both multiple choice and open questions, all 
focused on national policies that can contribute to decarbonization. This 
first set of questions built on the emerging literature on the pandemic’s 
potential impacts on climate policies and on past work surveying expert 
populations on climate policies. Second, we pre-tested our survey with a 
small sample of experts and researchers who provided feedback and 
comments on the questions, including information on the questions that 
they deemed more important. We then produced the final and shorter 
version of the survey, which included 33 questions and was estimated to 
take 7–10 min. 
Survey data and descriptive statistics 
We developed an online survey using the software Qualtrics, and we 
administered it to a selection of policymakers and stakeholders with 
country-specific climate policy expertise. We collected a total of 223 
complete responses. We collected 104 responses on OECD countries 
(OECD), 52 on Asian countries - excluding Middle East, Japan, Korea 
and Former Soviet Union countries (ASIA); and 49 on Latin America and 
Caribbean countries (LAM). In the main text we present results for these 
three regions (total N = 205). We also collected 9 responses on Former 
Soviet Union countries (REF), 3 responses on Middle East and African 
countries (MAF), and 6 on Balkan countries. Table A1 presents the 
number of responses per region and per country. Table A2 presents 
descriptive statistics on the type of organization respondents work for. 
Results for the regions not in included in the main analyses 
As we were able to collect only 9 responses on Former Soviet Union 
countries (REF), 3 responses on Middle East and African countries 
(MAF), and 6 on Balkan countries, and these countries do not signifi-
cantly contribute to global emissions, we do not present data on them in 
the main text. in Fig. A1 Fig. A2 we present key results for these three 
regions, focusing on expected emission trends, financial support for 
high-carbon energy and industry sectors, and public spending for 
climate mitigation. 
Results on expectations on emission reduction policies in different 
sectors. 
Table A1 
Number of responses per region and per country.  
OECD  ASIA  LAM  
Country N Country N Country N 
Australia 2 Afghanistan 1 Antigua and Barbuda 1 
Austria 1 China 5 Argentina 1 
Canada 6 India 23 Belize 1 
Czech Republic 1 Indonesia 2 Brazil 23 
European Union 20 Myanmar 1 Chile 2 
France 4 Nepal 1 Colombia 1 
Germany 10 Philippines 1 Costa Rica 1 
Israel 1 Singapore 1 Dominica 1 
Italy 3 Taiwan 1 Jamaica 1 
Japan 21 Thailand 10 Mexico 13 
Netherlands 3 Viet Nam 6 Panama 1 
New Zealand 1   Peru 3 
Norway 1     
Poland 1     
Portugal 1     
Slovakia 1     
South Korea 14     
Spain 1     
Sweden 1     
Switzerland 1     
Turkey 1     
United Kingdom 6     
United States of 
America 
3     
Total 104  52  49 
REF  MAF  BALKANS  
Country N Country N Country N 
Armenia 2 Lebanon 1 Albania 1 
Russia 6 Malawi 1 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2 
Ukraine 1 South Africa 1 Macedonia 2     
Serbia 1 
Total 9  3  6  
Table A2 
Respondents’ organization type.  
Organization type N 
Government 83 
International organization 22 
Non-governmental organization 25 
Private sector 18 
Research or academic 61 
Think tank 14 
Total 223  
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Fig. A1. Likert scale plot of the answers to the 
questions on expectations Financial Support for High- 
Carbon Energy and Industry Sectors, Public Spending 
for Climate Mitigation, and Emission Trends, in 
Former Soviet Union countries (REF), Middle East 
and African countries (MAF), and Balkan countries. 
Answers based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
significantly unlikely to significantly likely for the 
first item and from significantly decrease to signifi-
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Fig. A2. Likert scale plot of the answers to the questions on expectations on Commitment to Policies to Reduce Emissions in the Building, Industrial, Land, and 
Transport sector in OECD, Asian and Latina American countries. Answers based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from significantly decrease to significantly increase. 
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Appendix A. Supplementary data 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi. 
org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102025. 
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D. Lamboll, C.L. Quéré, J. Rogelj, D. Rosen, C.-F. Schleussner, T.B. Richardson, C. 
J. Smith, S.T. Turnock, Current and future global climate impacts resulting from 
COVID-19, Nat. Clim. Chang. 10 (10) (2020) 913–919, https://doi.org/10.1038/ 
s41558-020-0883-0. 
[4] Z. Liu, P. Ciais, Z. Deng, R. Lei, S.J. Davis, S. Feng, B.o. Zheng, D. Cui, X. Dou, 
B. Zhu, R. Guo, P. Ke, T. Sun, C. Lu, P. He, Y. Wang, X.u. Yue, Y. Wang, Y. Lei, 
H. Zhou, Z. Cai, Y. Wu, R. Guo, T. Han, J. Xue, O. Boucher, E. Boucher, 
F. Chevallier, K. Tanaka, Y. Wei, H. Zhong, C. Kang, N. Zhang, B. Chen, F. Xi, 
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